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This study shows the influence of occupational licensing on two occupations that provide similar 
services: occupational therapists and physical therapists. Most of the tasks for these two occupations 
differ, but several jobs overlap, and individuals in both occupations could have legal jurisdiction over 
these tasks. We empirically examine how these two occupations interact with one another in the labor 
market on wage determination and employment. Unlike previous studies, our study examines two 
occupations that are female dominated both within the professions and among its leadership. Our results 
show that occupational licensing can raise the wages of members of both occupations, but the duration of 
state occupational licensing statutes is the dominant influence on wage determination. Occupational 
licensing is also associated with a reduction in annual hours worked and in the relative numbers of 
members in each of the professions. Moreover, the ability of physical therapists to have direct access to 
patients is associated with a reduction in hourly earnings for occupational therapists, suggesting some 
substitution for certain service tasks across the two occupations. The ability of these two occupations to 
be both complements to and substitutes for one another provides new evidence on how the growing 
number of regulated occupations that are similar interact and influence one another. 
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In models of competitive labor markets, workers with overlapping skills are assumed to 
compete for work. With the introduction of occupational licensing, these regulations may 
function as a barrier to entry that drives up wages in the licensed occupation and increases the 
prices of products and services that are produced by licensed workers (Friedman and Kuznets 
1945; Friedman 1962; Kleiner and Krueger 2013).  In addition, there can be further allocative 
inefficiencies through deadweight losses introduced by these regulations (Schmidt 2012).  
The governmental regulation of occupations has been among the fastest-growing labor 
market institutions in the U.S. economy. Kleiner and Krueger (2013) estimate that the proportion 
of all American workers covered by occupational regulations increased from about 5 percent in 
the 1970s to almost 29 percent in 2008 (Kleiner and Krueger 2013). For example, during the 
2012–2013 legislative sessions, at least seven new occupations were licensed in at least one 
state—occupations ranging from scrap metal recyclers in Louisiana to body artists in the District 
of Columbia.1  
The health sector is especially subject to occupational regulations. The core health 
occupations—physicians, nurses, and dentists—are universally licensed. Over 76 percent of 
nonphysician health workers also are employed in licensed occupations (Kleiner and Park 2010). 
By definition, the purpose of a licensing regulation is to deny the legal right to perform a 
particular type of work to anyone who does not hold the appropriate credential for pay, and to 
impose conditions that restrict access for permission to do certain tasks. Licensing regulations 
are usually modeled as a barrier to entry in a particular type of market setting (Kleiner and 
Vorotnikov 2012).  
Early research considered the effects of licensing in health care markets (Friedman and 
Kuznets 1945; Friedman 1962). Subsequent analysis is concerned with the role of licenses in 
                                                 
1 These data are from a LexisNexis search of statutes passed during the legislative session.  
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markets that would otherwise produce suboptimal outcomes because of adverse selection of low-
quality workers (Leland 1979) or because members of an occupation may underinvest in job-
specific skills that may change over time (Shapiro 1986). Three types of models provide 
different insights into the welfare consequences of licensing regulations in different situations, 
but all three approaches imply that regulations can have important effects on the wages of 
different occupations. Conventional licensing arrangements are common in the health sector. But 
other occupational regulations, which do not fit the microeconomic model as well, are also quite 
prevalent. For example, states commonly impose regulations that limit the scope of practice of 
particular occupational groups, require supervisory relationships between members of two 
occupational groups, and limit the ability of health insurance companies to directly reimburse 
members of some occupational groups. These constraints may alter the production function that 
is used to combine the services of heterogeneous workers to efficiently provide health services. 
As a result, the wages and employment levels of these regulated occupations may be affected by 
these regulatory provisions.  
Understanding the effects of occupational regulation in the health sector is important. In 
2013, the health sector accounted for almost 18 percent of U.S. gross domestic product, and 
expenditures on provider services represented about 21 percent of total expenditures on health 
services (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 2014. If occupational regulations have 
even small effects on wages and employment, then the aggregate costs of regulation could be 
large. In principle, the regulations could also affect population health outcomes by making it 
harder for people to obtain health services.2  
                                                 
2 For example, allowing nurse practitioners to perform certain medical procedures is associated with a 
reduction in almost 10 percent for well-child checkups which could result in a reduction of $600 million dollars ($10 
× 60 million visits per year) (Kleiner et al. 2014). 
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In this study, we analyze the effects of occupational regulations in the health sector by 
focusing on the practice restrictions faced by two occupations: physical therapists (PT) and 
occupational therapists (OT). Across different situations, the services of a PT may function as 
either a substitute for or a complement to the services of other medical professionals such as an 
OT. It is possible, for example, that PTs provide a set of services that are very similar to the 
services offered by OTs but that are offered with a greater emphasis on factors such as 
convenience, personal attention, or specialization, which are important to some patients in some 
situations. In short, PTs are an ideal example of an occupation with training and productive 
capacities that in some cases overlap with other occupations such as OTs. This overlap means 
that the content and context of the work provided by PTs depend on a variety of occupational 
regulations that have varied across states and over time.  
 Using data from the American Community Survey (ACS), we analyze the effects of state-
level PT and OT regulations on wages and employment. To examine how PT and OT regulations 
affect wages, we use state statutory data over the period 2000–2011.  
The broad goal of our study is to develop a more detailed understanding of the way in 
which occupational regulations affect labor market outcomes in the United States. To examine 
this issue, we analyze how regulations affect the relative wages of two key health care 
occupations that are female dominated and are similar with respect to patient care. In addition, 
unlike earlier work that focused on occupations that were clearly dominant and subordinate, our 
study examines occupations that are largely equivalent in terms of their incomes, prices charged, 
education, and tasks (Kleiner and Park 2010; Kleiner et al. 2014). In our analysis we review 
some previous studies that show how some occupational groups can be both complements and 
substitutes in the delivery of certain medical services. We also show and give example of how 
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these two occupations have some overlap where regulations would matter for their labor market 
outcomes. Next, we explain the sources of our data on OT and PT regulations and labor market 
outcomes. We describe our econometric strategies and consider issues of internal validity and the 
sensitivity of the estimates to alternative specifications.  
To preview our empirical work, our estimates show that occupational licensing 
regulations for OT vary but are associated with a 0–6 percent wage increase based on the model 
specification, and that the length of time that licensing statutes have been in place are associated 
with higher wages in most of our models. Licensing and the length of time that it has been 
passed and implemented are associated with a reduction in the hours worked by both PTs and 
OTs, as well as with a reduction in the number of individuals who enter both occupations. These 
estimates suggest that regulation raises wages and reduces the supply of effort measured by 
hours of work and the relative number of workers in an occupation. Moreover, the licensed 
occupation that was initially licensed (PT) seemed to set the agenda for the regulation of the 
following occupation (OT). The remainder of the paper details how we developed these results.  
OVERVIEW OF OCCUPATIONAL REGULATIONS IN THE HEALTH SECTOR  
A large empirical literature is devoted to estimating the wage and employment effects of 
licensing regulations; it includes work related to a variety of health occupations.3 The literature 
concerned with overlapping occupations in which substitution and complementarity may be 
important is much smaller and more recent. Persico (2015) presents a theoretical model 
suggesting that when occupations are complementary, members of an incumbent occupation may 
have incentives to allow more individuals into the competing occupation. Occupational therapy 
                                                 
3 See Kleiner (2006) for a review of the empirical literature on the wage determination effects of licensing. 
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and physical therapy are plausibly complementary because patients who visit an OT for basic 
health services may also be referred to a PT for more complex or different but related care. More 
generally, the use of an OT for low complexity home care may free up time for PTs to specialize 
in more complex care, such as muscular/skeletal development. Hand care therapies are generally 
the specialty of occupational therapists, but physical therapists also claim this as a specialty. This 
type of care, which is essential to mobility, could be more lucrative in terms of billable hours. 
Some of these regulatory preferences may depend on the industrial organization of the medical 
sector. One conjecture is that health workers whose compensation depends in part on the 
economic performance of a particular health care firm might be less supportive of regulations 
that force the firm to adopt production processes that are not efficient.  
Some empirical work can be found on the regulation of overlapping occupations. Kleiner 
and Park (2010) provide evidence that occupational regulations that alter the boundaries between 
the work tasks of dentists and dental hygienists appear to affect the earnings of both occupational 
groups. In a similar manner, Wing and Marier (2014) study regulations that define whether a 
hygienist may independently perform particular dental procedures, allowing hygienists to 
perform the service leads to lower prices for that service. Stange (2014) examines the impact of 
changes in the supply of nurse practitioners and physician assistants, as well as the utilization 
and costs of health services. He finds that increases in the supply of nurse practitioners and 
physician assistants at the county level do not directly increase utilization, but nurse practitioner 
supply increases do lead to small gains in utilization in geographical areas that offer more 
independence to them, as measured by an index of regulations and by prescription drug 
authority. Our study focuses on the conceptual and empirical implications of the work task 
restrictions that are used to regulate OTs and PTs in many states. This approach is somewhat 
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distinct from the supply-side entry barrier framework that is standard in the licensing literature 
and which is implicit in Stange’s approach. Finally, we examine outcomes in these two labor 
markets that are closely connected to the importance of direct access by each of the occupations 
to patients or clients. This approach allows us to trace the effects of the regulations across 
different domains. In particular, we study how the regulations affect the wages and employment 
of PTs and OTs.  
INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND ON TWO SIMILAR LICENSED HEALTH CARE 
OCCUPATIONS  
The impact of different state licensure laws for the two professions in terms of the 
need for physician referral would certainly have workforce implications[;] whether 
this supports collaboration or points to growing differences between the two 
professions is still to be determined. In addition to concerns over the efforts to 
achieve unrestricted access directed by physical therapists, some occupational 
therapists are protesting what they believe to be added language in physical therapy 
practice acts in the area of “functional training in self‐care and in home, community 
or work reintegration.” Although this terminology has been in physical therapist 
education program accreditation criteria and practice acts for many years, the AOTA 
[American Occupational Therapy Association] has taken the position that this 
terminology is evidence of PTs encroachment into the scope of practice of OT. 
(Fisher and Keehn 2007, p. 26) 
 
The general work of occupational therapists and physical therapists each has a distinct 
focus. Occupational therapists train or retrain individuals to do general work that allows patients 
to work independently, whereas physical therapy focuses on physical rehabilitation and muscular 
and skeletal improvements. The two occupations overlap, however, in several areas: modality or 
method of treatment, wound care, and orthopedics, and foot care. A key issue for both 
occupations is to get insurers to pay for direct access rather than be billed through a medical 
facility or through a physician’s office. Another key element for both occupations is how they 
bill through Medicare or how they are reimbursed for care. 
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What Tasks Do Occupational Therapists Do? 
As defined by the occupation, occupational therapists define their work as follows: 
The therapeutic use of everyday life activities (occupations) with individuals or 
groups for the purpose of participation in roles and situations in home, school, 
workplace, community, and other settings. Occupational therapy services are 
provided for the purpose of promoting health and wellness and to those who have 
or are at risk for developing an illness, injury, disease, disorder, condition, 
impairment, disability, activity limitation, or participation restriction. 
Occupational therapy addresses the physical, cognitive, psychosocial, 
sensory, and other aspects of performance in a variety of contexts to support 
engagement in everyday life activities that affect health, well-being, and quality 
of life. (American Occupational Therapy Association 2004, p. 694)  
 
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2014), the entry-level requirements for an OT 
degree include a master’s degree. Many in the occupation, however, including those in the 
occupational association, see the entry qualifications as evolving to a doctoral degree.  
In contrast, PT tasks are noted as follows: “Physical therapists help people who have 
injuries or illnesses improve their movement and manage their pain. They are often an important 
part of rehabilitation and treatment of patients with chronic conditions or injuries” (Bureau of 
Labor Statistics 2014).  
As of 2015, the current entry point into the occupation of physical therapist is a 
professional doctoral degree that requires three years of classroom work and internships beyond 
a bachelor’s degree. A key element for both occupations is direct access to the patient and billing 
procedures for Medicare and health insurance. 
INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND FOR REGULATING PTS AND OTS 
 Physical therapy as an occupation gained much greater public attention as a medical 
intervention and was used more extensively following the U.S. participation in World Wars I and 
II. During and following these conflicts, wounded soldiers benefited from a combination of 
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surgery and nonevasive procedures such as physical therapy. The number of physical therapists 
grew, and their procedures generally involved similar processes and standard patient care. The 
physical therapists then formed organizations that were the initial movers to obtain occupational 
licensing across states. Pennsylvania was the first state to license physical therapists in 1913, 
followed by New York in 1926 and Kansas in 2003; Kansas is used as a case study in our 
analysis.  
 In a similar manner, occupational therapists were regulated much later than physical 
therapists. The first state to license occupational therapists was Florida in 1975. In 2013 
Colorado licensed occupational therapists, but Hawaii did not pass a law to fully license 
occupational therapists until 2014. The passage of laws and how long they have been in effect 
influenced OT and were likely influenced by the passage of PT laws many decades earlier, but 
not the other way around. Consequently, we suspect that the wages of OTs and PTs would be 
determined independently. Therefore, we suspect that the duration of the passage of licensing 
laws for PTs would influence the wages of OTs and may serve as a reasonable instrumental 
variable in our subsequent analysis.  
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING PT AND OT INTERACTIONS 
 Classical models of occupational licensing are concerned with explicit barriers to 
entering a profession (requirements involving exams, moral standing, and the availability of 
accredited schools) and with how the barriers affect wages and employment quality under 
different market settings (i.e., perfect competition, adverse selection, moral hazard). The scope of 
practice regulations is conceptually distinct from entry barriers, although in many situations they 
may lead to similar economic outcomes. A scope of practice regulation does not directly make it 
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harder for a person to enter the OT or PT profession. Instead, the regulations define work tasks 
that members of the occupation are not allowed to perform, and they may impose procedures and 
supervision requirements that must be followed by each occupation that performs certain tasks. 
Occupation-specific work tasks and work procedure regulations could affect the production of 
health services in a variety of ways. Limits on work tasks could restrict the effective productivity 
of OTs relative to PTs, and the limits and procedural requirements could make it more difficult 
to substitute OT labor for PT labor in production. 
Our empirical strategy in this paper is based on quasi-experimental variation in state 
regulations, but we do not attempt to build a structural model of the market for basic health 
services. The theoretical approach is there, however, to guide our analysis and interpretation; we 
worked with a very simple model that clarifies some mechanisms through which scope of 
practice regulations may lead to different economic outcomes. The model highlights the way in 
which occupational regulations can act as a constraint on production functions that combine 
heterogeneous labor inputs such as OT and PT.  
Analyzing Similar Occupations  
Many of the tasks of OTs and PTs are similar. Both occupations engage in generally 
nonevasive procedures to allow clients or patients to increase their strength and become more 
mobile within their environments. Each occupation establishes tasks that are different from one 
another. However, some tasks overlap and are common to both occupations. Figure 1 is a Venn 
diagram that conceptually shows both the differences and similarities between OTs and PTs. As 
the diagram illustrates, most of the tasks and some of the objectives of PTs and OTs differ, but a 
number of jobs and tasks overlap. For these tasks, individuals in both occupations can perform 
them, and OTs and PTs can serve as substitutes for one another. Occupational licensing laws can 
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allocate these tasks to either OTs or PTs, with a resulting increase in earnings and more work for 
the occupation that has tasks that are capable of being allocated to the job. We attempt to 
empirically examine how these occupations interact with one another in the labor market 
regarding their wage determination and employment and how occupational licensing may 
influence their labor market behavior.  
DATA AND SAMPLE DESCRIPTION  
Measures of Licensing and Regulation 
We collected information on statutes and the statutory changes regulating occupational 
therapists from the state-by-state law database from the American Occupational Therapy 
Association. The data show in which year each state passed a licensing or registration law as 
well as the current licensing (registration) requirements set by each state board. We collected the 
corresponding information on statutes regulating physical therapists from the board of physical 
therapy in each state. All 50 states license PTs, and each state had passed a licensure law at least 
by 2003 in addition virtually all PTs and OTs are both covered and have attained a license 
(Gittleman and Kleiner 2016). We contacted the board of physical therapy in a state if we were 
not able to get the precise year of the legislation. This approach allowed us to obtain information 
for all fifty states for the period 1995–2013. 
In Figures 2A and 2B we show how the numbers of states that license OTs and PTs have 
grown over time and Figure 3 shows the number of OTs and PTs in the various data sets that we 
use. Figure 2 shows that 40 states passed a licensure law for OTs by 1995, and this number 
increased to 49 in 2011 (including Washington, DC). Only Hawaii has a less restrictive 
registration law regulating OTs. Colorado did not regulate any OTs until the state passed a 
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registration law in 2008 and a licensing law in 2013. For the growth of PT licensing, we plot the 
numbers over 1950–1975, a period during which most states started to license PTs. The first 
mover states that passed licensure laws before the 1950s were Pennsylvania, New York, and 
Connecticut. We calculate the durations of licensure for each state based on the year in which the 
states passed their first licensure law for OTs and PTs.  
Figure 3, Panel A, shows a comparison of national total employment of OTs over time 
from the three data sources. Since 2002, the numbers of OTs from the American Occupational 
Therapy Association (AOTA) survey have been larger than the numbers from the other sources.4 
The board survey numbers may include those not active in the labor force but still holding an 
unexpired license; therefore, we think that the simulated totals based on the OES is closer to the 
actual OT workforce population.5 The OT population calculated from the weighted ACS sample 
is likely an underestimate of the actual total OT employment compared with the other two data 
series. In contrast, for PTs we estimate the national total employment from two sources: the ACS 
and Occupational Employment Statistics (OES). The values from the PT sample in the ACS are 
similar to the PT statistics in OES, which suggests that the PT sample in the ACS is more 
representative of the actual PT workforce population.  
The March Current Population Survey (CPS) also collects wage and income information 
from individuals and households, and the data are available for longer time series than the ACS. 
It also has additional covariates such as unionization and the ability to examine outgoing rotation 
groups. Because of the limit on the sample size, we use the 1995–2011 sample from the CPS file 
as a robustness test in addition to the wage and employment model using ACS data.  
                                                 
4 According to the published OT Licensees Totals from the AOTA survey of state regulatory boards and 
rosters of licensees, no information is available before 2002 for California and Michigan—two of the states that 
have the largest OT population. This could largely account for the underestimation of the national total. 
5 Refer to the notes in Figure 3 for the calculation of simulated totals of the OT workforce. 
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For the legal requirements we track any substantial changes on licensing requirements 
from 2000 to 2010 through the LexisNexis legal research database. The criteria and policies we 
used are shown in Table A.6. We also collected information on the state legislative and register 
archives as alternative sources for the information on updates and amendments to statutes as well 
as administrative rules.  
We focus on the legal authority for an OT or a PT to practice with or without a referral 
from a physician or other medical professionals, which is usually part of the operation standards 
set by a state board through its licensure statute. This is also understood as the direct access to 
OT and PT services by patients. Figure 4 shows the growth in direct access to therapy services 
during the period 1995–2011. Although OT licensure has a much shorter history than PT 
licensure in the United States, in the early 2000s the practice of OT was not restricted by 
physician referral in more than 35 states (including those states that were not licensing OTs at the 
time)—a number much greater than the number of states with unlimited access to PT services. 
Starting in 2000, many more states started to reduce barriers of access to PT services. These 
states have mostly allowed PT treatment without physician referral under some restrictions, 
which led to a dramatic growth of direct access to PT service. By 2011, only five states restricted 
access for direct treatment by PTs or OTs.  
Age, education, and examinations are common criteria when OTs or PTs first apply for a 
license. Figure 5 plots the distribution of the licensing requirement index, which we calculate 
from a set of components that are considered barriers to entry to becoming a licensed OT or PT. 
The figure shows that OT regulations became more restrictive during the past decade, with an 
increase in the mean and a slight decrease in the variance. This reflects not only the movement of 
regulation from a less restrictive law to a licensure law by a few states, but also the increase in 
13 
regulation intensity by those states who began to license OTs before the period of analysis. For 
example, some states began to establish or increase hours of continuing education a few years 
after a licensure law was passed. Table 1 displays the descriptive values of the regulation 
requirement index, and Table 2 lists the states with the most and least restrictive details on 
licensing requirements. In Table 3 we show the years in which a state enacted a statute regulating 
OTs or PTs during the period for which we have labor market data.  
Measures of Wages and Labor Supply  
We use ACS data from 2000 to 2010 to extract our basic sample of OTs and PTs. Using 
the Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) System, we find that 21,394 are identified PTs 
in the ACS survey sample, and 10,134 are identified as OTs. The ACS data are based on census 
interviews with individuals and allow for wage and employment analysis by state with various 
covariates such as demographic background and human capital variables.  
The wage estimates are constructed by applying several restrictions to exclude unpaid 
family workers, individuals with invalid educational attainment (those with below some college 
education), or inappropriate years of experience. We also eliminate individuals in the sample 
over age 65 or with more than 60 working hours a week. In addition to all these restrictions, the 
original sample is trimmed down by excluding individuals whose wages are below the federal 
minimum wage level or with an hourly wage in the top 1 percent of the sample.6 The final 
sample size that we used in our analysis is reduced by 5 percent for OTs (9,668) and 7 percent 
for PTs (19,788) compared with the original sample. 
We calculated the measure of hourly wages based on individuals’ income from salaries as 
well as their returns from business income. Our sample from the ACS data shows that 7 percent 
                                                 
6 See Table A.2 for details regarding sample construction. 
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of OTs and 10 percent of PTs are self-employed. We also calculated individuals’ annual number 
of hours worked using the information from the weekly working hours and the number of weeks 
per year in the ACS. Figure 6 shows the kernel distribution of hourly rates for OT and PT from 
the 2010 sample. The PT sample has a pattern similar to that of the wage distribution in the OT 
sample, but with a slightly higher level of mean value. Table 4 includes the weighted mean on 
wages and annual hours of labor supply for the pooled sample for the period 2000–2010. PTs 
earn $30 per hour on average, whereas the hourly earnings average for OTs is about $28.  
Other Data Sources Used to Test for Robustness  
 The ACS is our main data source and provides measures of wages, labor supply, and 
other covariates. We also obtained data on wages and total employment by state and year from 
three other data sources. First, the OES provides annual wage and employment information for 
each occupational category. It is collected from a Department of Labor employer survey but does 
not cover the self-employed, unincorporated firms, or unpaid family workers. The data in the 
OES allow for wage and employment estimates for OTs and PTs at the state level but without 
covariates at the individual level. Second, the AOTA also conducts annual surveys of state 
regulatory boards and rosters of licensees, but it does not collect the type of data that are in either 
the ACS or OES. 
Descriptive Statistics  
 Table 4 shows the means and standard deviations of wage and employment variables and 
the covariates for the OT and PT samples. The individual average annual hours of work derived 
from the OT sample is 1,661. Similarly, the annual hours worked based on the PT sample was 
1,789. The OTs have 16.4 years of professional experience—slightly higher than that of PTs. 
The OT sample has a higher percentage with a bachelor’s degree, whereas the PT sample has a 
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relatively higher percentage—around 46 percent—with a degree beyond an undergraduate 
education. These results are consistent with the evolution of education requirements for both 
occupations.7 Females are the dominant gender in both occupations.—more than 90 percent of 
the OTs and about 70 percent of the PTs in our sample are women. In addition, about 13 percent 
of OTs and 11 percent of PTs are part-time workers, and 7 percent of OTs and almost 10 percent 
of PTs are self-employed. Moreover, about 19 percent of OTs work for government agencies, 
whereas less than 8 percent of PTs work do. Generally, the differences in ACS data for OTs and 
PTs lie in gender distribution, educational group distribution, and type of work.  
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Our Basic Model 
From the theoretical background, the assumption is an optimal combination of labor 
inputs from OTs and PTs, but they are affected by the changes in the regulations in both 
occupations. We examine the regulation effect on the hourly wages for both occupations, 
because we assume that the change in regulations shifts the market supply curves of these two 
occupations. The basic wage model is 
(1)  ln⁡(𝐸𝑖𝑠𝑡
𝑜𝑡/𝑝𝑡
) = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑅𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛿𝑠 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝑖𝑠𝑡,  
where ln⁡(𝐸𝑖𝑠𝑡
𝑜𝑡/𝑝𝑡
) is the logged hourly earnings of OTs or PTs from person i in state s at time 
period t. 𝑅𝑠𝑡 is the vector of regulation measures for OTs and PTs in state s in time period t; the 
vector 𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 includes covariates measuring the characteristics of each person; 𝛿𝑠 and 𝜃𝑡 are state 
and year fixed effects; and 𝑖𝑠𝑡 is the error term. 
                                                 
7 Physical therapists will require a Doctor of Physical Therapy degree for full licensure in most states by 
2016; occupational therapists are considering increasing requirements to a similar level.  
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Next we examine the regulation effect on the labor supply for these two occupations. The 
basic employment model can be written as follows: 
(2)  𝐿𝑖𝑠𝑡
𝑜𝑡/𝑝𝑡
= 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑅𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛿𝑠 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝑖𝑠𝑡,  
where 𝐿𝑖𝑠𝑡
𝑜𝑡/𝑝𝑡
is the measure of person i’s labor participation as an OT/PT in state s at time period 
t, so it equals one if person i is an OT/PT and zero if person i works in a different occupational 
category. 𝑅𝑠𝑡 is the vector of regulation measures for OTs and PTs in state s in time period t; the 
vector 𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 includes covariates measuring the characteristics of each person; 𝛿𝑠 and 𝜃𝑡 are state 
and year fixed effects; and 𝑖𝑠𝑡 is the error term. Both the linear and nonlinear probability 
models are applied to test Equation (2). 
We further examine the influence of regulation labor inputs using measures of working 
hours by OTs and PTs. The model is described as follows:  
(3) 𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑡
𝑜𝑡/𝑝𝑡
= 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑅𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛿𝑠 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝑖𝑠𝑡 .  
 
In this model, 𝐻𝑖𝑠𝑡
𝑜𝑡/𝑝𝑡
 equals the annual hours of labor supply as an OT/PT from person i in state 
s at time period t. 𝑅𝑠𝑡 is the vector of regulation measures for OTs and PTs in state s in time 
period t; the vector 𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 includes covariates measuring the characteristics of each person; 𝛿𝑠 and 
𝜃𝑡 are state and year fixed effects; and 𝑖𝑠𝑡 is the error term. 
 The model we implement is applied to occupation-specific log wages and is a fixed 
effects version of the standard cross-sectional human capital wage equation, which leads to a few 
subtleties concerning how to construct the market-level regulatory effect estimates. We estimated 
the earnings equations using two different approaches. In the first approach, we estimated the 
model using the full micro-level data set and estimated standard errors that are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and clustering at the state level. In the second approach, we aggregated the 
data to the level of state x year cells using the two-stage procedure described in the work of 
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Hanushek (1974), Amemiya (1978), and Conley and Taber (2011). In the first stage, individual-
level outcomes are regressed on individual covariates and a full set of state × time fixed effects. 
The coefficients on the state × time fixed effects represent state × time cell means that have been 
purged of the variation associated with the within-cell variation in the covariates. In the second 
stage, the covariate-adjusted cell means are regressed on the policy variables, state fixed effects, 
and year fixed effects as described above. Standard errors are again constructed to allow for 
heteroskedasticity and clustering at the state level.  
Use of Instrumental Variables  
Though our model assumes that the causal effect of regulations has an impact on market 
outcomes, we do not ignore the potential issue that licensing variables are endogenous in 
Equation (2), since other observed and unobserved factors may affect both wages and 
regulations, or market factors may affect regulations. Moreover, occupations in a state that have 
low earnings may seek additional regulations in order to raise earnings or gain further control 
over labor supply factors. Since PT was regulated 20–30 years earlier than OT, the duration of 
the regulations by PT would likely influence when a state would license OT, but not necessarily 
the wages of practitioners of OT, which are determined by market factors and price setting by 
government and insurance agencies. Consequently, the duration of PT would serve as a 
potentially good instrumental variable to deal with the endogeneity of the regulations and wage 
determination of the occupations.8  
Influence of Licensure and Duration on Wage Determination  
 Our wage model in Equation (1) estimates a basic two-state two-period difference-in-
difference model for the treatment effect of regulation. We use two measures of regulation for 
                                                 
8 These estimates are presented in Table A.8. 
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licensing: the basic dummy variable, which indicates that a state licenses OTs in year t, and a 
partially continuous variable, which indicates the number of years since the initial licensure took 
place or what we call a duration variable. In Table 5, the main results for the regulation effect are 
presented in columns 3, 6, and 8. Estimates using a model with only year fixed effects and 
additional controls with year fixed effects are presented. The first three columns show that when 
a licensing law is passed, the wage of OTs increases by 7 percent in the model with year fixed 
effects but has no impact on wages in the model with both state and year fixed effects. On the 
other hand, when we estimate logged hourly wages on the duration since licensing, one more 
year after licensing contributes to approximately a 1.2 percent wage increase in the main model. 
In the IV model, the duration of an OT licensing law is associated with a 7 percent wage effect. 
The test of endogeneity shows a statistically significant result, which implies that the duration of 
OT licensing should be treated as endogenous.9  
Using the numbers in the OES annual report, Figure 7 shows a plot of the average hourly 
wage from 2000 through 2010 for PTs in Kansas. Kansas is the only state that started licensing 
PTs in 2003, and it was the last state to license these workers in the occupation. When the 
Kansas PT Practice Act was implemented in 2004, PT wages in the state substantially increased. 
The figure shows that the wage gap between Kansas and the national average for PTs narrowed 
from more than 10 percent in 2004 to about 3 percent in 2010. These data provide a case study of 
licensing reducing the wage gap for physical therapists.10  
Panel B of Table 5 shows the estimates of the influence of licensing PTs on their hourly 
wages. Only one state changer switched from a certification law to a licensing law in 2003 using 
                                                 
9 For a test of endogeneity, Wooldridge’s (2005) robust score test and a robust regression-based test are 
performed in our two-stage least-squares IV estimation with clustered standard errors at the state level.  
10 Additional tests of changes in other states prior to the passage of a law in Kansas showed no clear effects 
of adoption of licensing on wage determination. 
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both state and year fixed effects. With a licensure dummy variable, we find positive but not 
significant effects in the OLS model. Moreover, the duration of licensing PTs is associated with 
an approximately 3 percent wage increase per year according to columns (6) and (7) as well as 
columns (9) and (10), but the magnitudes of the coefficients vary by model specification.  
Wage Effects of Access to Services 
 As shown in Figure 4, patients’ direct access to therapy services has been one of the most 
prominent issues for PTs during the past decade, when most states that had given no direct 
access to PT services began to allow limited access under certain conditions. At the same time, 
OTs can have direct access change in different directions. For example, the level of access is 
assumed to have declined if a state passed a licensing statute for OTs and subsequently restricted 
access via statute.  
We assume that two occupations with a potentially overlapping scope of practice may 
substitute for or complement each other when one of the occupations experienced a substantial 
change based on their level of access. Therefore, we examine the wage effect of one occupation 
changing its level of direct access on both occupations. In Table 6, indicators for OT and PT 
access are each included in the OT wage models separately and then together in the same 
equation. In columns (1)–(3), OT access levels are interacted with licensure status, so those 
states with unlimited access to OT services before they license OTs are grouped separately from 
those states with licensing laws but unrestricted access, and the omitted group is state by year 
groups with no access. In columns (4)–(6), the partial OT sample with state-years having 
licensing laws are used in estimation, so the net effect from an increase in direct access is tested 
conditionally on no variation on licensing status. The PT access level is represented by a dummy 
variable grouping limited or unlimited access relative to no access, since no state changed to 
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unlimited access from a different level during the period. All models use controls for state and 
year fixed effects. We find that a state-year gaining direct access to PT services bid down the 
wages for OT by approximately 5 percent. At the same time, changing from no access to having 
access to OT services has a positive but not significant relationship with OT wages. The results 
for PT wage models are presented in columns (7)–(9). We did not find any significant results of 
direct access with respect to PT wages. Overall, direct access to OT and PT services was likely 
affecting the wages of the two occupations in opposite directions, which implied substitution 
between OTs and PTs. However, only the increase of PT direct access significantly causes a 
change in wage outcomes from this type of competition.11  
Employment Effects of Licensure and Its Duration 
We initially estimate an employment model with a dummy variable for labor force 
participation as an OT/PT with employment relative to other occupations. Since the total 
employment within an occupation is determined by a large variety of factors, we also include 
estimates from aggregate and alternative employment estimates using data from the OES data in 
the appendices.  
  Results for OTs are presented in Table 7. Licensing OTs is associated with a negative 
relationship on the probability of being an OT in the labor force, and this change is consistent in 
all specifications. These estimates are also consistent with the results in the wage equations, 
since a downward shift in supply is associated with an increase in market wages. In the PT 
models, the results presented in Table 8 do not show estimates from a fixed effect model with a 
licensure dummy, because the only state that changed its licensing status (Kansas) does not have 
                                                 
11 In Table A.7 we show the influence of each occupation in a combined sample of the two occupations. 
The results show that OT wages are lower than those for PTs and that their hours worked per year are lower than 
that for PTs. 
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a large enough sample for stable employed PTs to estimate the full fixed effects model. Instead, 
we only report estimates from the duration estimates. The general trends indicate a decline in the 
probability of being employed (or self-employed) as a PT when the duration of licensing is 
longer, and this is reflected when both state and year fixed effects are controlled for.  
For each specification, we apply both the linear probability model and the nonlinear 
probit model to test for the robustness of our estimates. The first halves of Tables 7 and 8 present 
the linear regressions results, and the second parts report the marginal effects from a probit 
model. The nonlinear models generate estimates in the same direction as linear models do, and 
the magnitude of parameters is smaller. 
Estimates of Annual Hours of Labor Supply 
Licensing an occupation not only increases the entry barriers that restrict the employment 
of that occupation, but also clarifies the practice standard of that occupation so that professionals 
are not allowed to do tasks beyond their scope of practice. Table 9 shows that passing a licensing 
law in a state negatively affects the annual hours of labor supply by OTs and PTs. OTs worked 
47 hours less per year after getting licensed, and PTs worked 43 hours less. A second set of 
estimates shown in the table provides evidence that the decline in labor supply mostly occurred 
during a shorter period of time after licensing began. In the long run, we do not observe a 
significant downward shift in working hours. In contrast, the duration since licensing began is 
positively associated with the annual hours of labor supply, but the influence is small. This could 
be explained by the expanding of scope of practice, increasing coverage under national medical 
programs, and the potential increase in demand for services, all of which accompany the more 
complete and mature licensing system over time.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
  Our analysis shows the influence of occupational licensing for two occupations that 
provide similar services: occupational therapists and physical therapists. Unlike previous 
examinations of occupations that provide overlapping services, where one occupation dominates 
the other in its ability to provide higher value-added tasks, our examination reveals that these two 
occupations are similar in the areas of education, age, and income. In addition, unlike previous 
research on occupational licensing, our study examines two occupations that are female 
dominated both within the professions and among its leadership. The ability to examine the labor 
market consequences of the level and changes of occupational licensing and its duration adds to 
the field’s knowledge of how occupational licensing works in the United States. 
 Our results show that occupational licensing raises the wages of OTs and PTs and that the 
dominant influence on wage determination is the length of time that an occupation has been 
licensed in a state. Moreover, the ability of PTs to have direct access to patients is associated 
with a reduction in hourly earnings for OTs, suggesting some substitution for certain services 
across the two occupations. The introduction of a licensing statute reduces the relative number of 
both OTs and PTs. A licensing statute also negatively influences hours worked in the short run. 
For PTs, the duration of licensing is associated with a reduction in the relative number of 
practitioners. The ability of these two occupations to be both complements to and substitutes for 
one another provides new evidence on how regulated occupations influence one another. Further 
examination of how regulation influences patient care and costs would add a great deal to 
understanding the role that occupational regulation has in the labor market and the economy. 
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Table 1  Growth of Regulation Intensity over Time 
 
 
Panel A: Occupational Therapist 
Year 
Number of 
states Mean St. dev. Min. Max. 
2000 51 3.05 1.57 0 5.88 
2001 51 3.14 1.53 0 5.88 
2002 51 3.26 1.47 0 5.88 
2003 51 3.40 1.40 0 5.88 
2004 51 3.44 1.39 0 5.88 
2005 51 3.49 1.37 0 5.88 
2006 51 3.57 1.38 0 5.88 
2007 51 3.57 1.37 0 6.01 
2008 51 3.64 1.31 1 5.90 
2009 51 3.71 1.24 1 5.90 
2010 51 3.75 1.23 1 5.90 
2011 51 3.77 1.24 1 5.90 
 
Panel B: Physical Therapist 
Year 
Number of 
states Mean St. dev. Min. Max. 
2000 51 3.99 1.42 1.55 7.75 
2001 51 4.05 1.41 1.55 7.75 
2002 51 4.11 1.40 1.55 7.75 
2003 51 4.25 1.37 1.55 7.75 
2004 51 4.29 1.37 1.55 7.75 
2005 51 4.35 1.42 1.55 7.75 
2006 51 4.50 1.48 1.55 7.75 
2007 51 4.56 1.52 1.55 7.75 
2008 51 4.74 1.48 1.55 7.75 
2009 51 4.88 1.46 1.55 7.75 
2010 51 4.92 1.49 1.55 7.75 




Table 2  State Regulation Rankings of the Top and Bottom States for the Restrictiveness of Their Licensing 
(or Registration) on Therapist, 2010 
 
 
Panel A: Occupational Therapist 





New Hampshire 5.9 Colorado 1 
Maryland 5.88 Hawaii 1 
Washington 5.73 Pennsylvania 1.21 
Arkansas 5.65 Utah 1.79 
Maine 5.5 Massachusetts 2.04 
Nevada 5.38 Illinois 2.36 
 
 
Panel B: Physical Therapist 





Nevada 7.75 South Dakota 1.55 
Washington DC 7.61 Colorado 1.88 
Louisiana 7.58 Indiana 2 
Idaho 6.95 Vermont 2.5 
New Hampshire 6.9 Massachusetts 2.95 





Table 3  States that Enacted a Licensure Law for Regulating Occupational Therapists or Physical Therapists, 
2000–2010 
State Occupation Year of licensure law 
California OT 2000 
Indiana OT 2007 
Kansas  OT 2002 
Michigan OT 2009 
Minnesota OT 2000 
Vermont OT 2002 
Wisconsin OT 2000 






Table 4  Descriptive Statistics for Occupational Therapists and Occupational Therapists using ACS, 2000–
2010 
 
Occupational therapists  Occupational therapists 
 




  Hourly earnings 28.203 12.657  30.116 15.455 
Annual hours 1,661 628.5  1,789 647.2 
Experience 16.420 10.147  16.132 9.963 
Bachelor  0.575 0.494  0.448 0.497 
Master 0.325 0.468  0.414 0.493 
Doctor 0.005 0.069  0.044 0.205 
Male 0.098 0.298  0.293 0.455 
Married 0.678 0.467  0.700 0.458 
White 0.883 0.322  0.854 0.353 
Black 0.043 0.202  0.035 0.183 
Citizenship 0.966 0.180  0.939 0.239 
Part-time 0.127 0.333  0.111 0.314 
Self-employed 0.072 0.259  0.098 0.297 
Work for profit 0.486 0.500  0.570 0.495 
Work for nonprofit 0.248 0.432  0.254 0.436 
Work for gov’t 0.194 0.396  0.077 0.267 


















Table 5  Effects of Regulations on Log Wage for Occupational Therapists and Physical Therapists, ACS 2000–2010 
 
 
Panel A: Occupational Therapist 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
------------------------------------------One-Stage Model--------------------------------------- ------------Two-Stage Model---------- 
OT licensure 0.0611** 0.0775** −0.0288 
   
 −0.0284   
 
(3.27) (4.46) (-0.86) 
   
 (−0.83)   
OT duration 
   
0.00084 0.0015** 0.0122* 0.0103  0.0122* 0.0103 
    
(1.51) (2.89) (2.56) (1.59)  (2.31) (1.48) 
OT duration 
      
0.0044   0.004 
squared 
      
(0.43)   (0.41) 
Covariates N Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y 
State FE N N Y N N Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
R-squared 0.09 0.19 0.23 0.09 0.18 0.23 0.23 0.57 0.57 0.57 
1st stage N 9,668 9,668 9,668 9,668 9,668 9,668 9,668 9,668 9,668 9,668 
2nd stage N n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 546 546 546 
NOTE: t-statistics are reported in parentheses. + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.005. 
OT licensure is 1 if OT is licensed in the current year in the state of residence, and is 0 otherwise. Ot duration is the number of years since licensed if OT is licensed in the current 
year in the state of residence, and 0 otherwise.  
 
Panel B: Physical Therapist 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
-------------------------------------------One-Stage Model-------------------------------------------------- --------Two-Stage Model------- 
PT licensure 0.219** 0.0758 0.0187 
   
 0.0177+   
 
(2.70) (1.41) (1.58) 
   
 (1.79)   
PT duration 
   
0.00087** 0.00055* 0.027*** 0.038***  0.027*** 0.039*** 
    
(2.98) (2.18) (3.06) (2.81)  (7.38) (5.55) 
PT duration 
      
−0.005*   −0.005* 
squared 
      
(−2.16)   (−2.06) 
Covariates N Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y 
State FE N N Y N N Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
R-squared 0.05 0.19 0.21 0.05 0.19 0.21 0.21 0.57 0.57 0.57 
1st stage N 19,788 19,788 19,788 19,788 19,788 19,788 19,788 19,788 19,788 19,788 
2nd stage N n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 548 548 548 
NOTE: t-statistics are reported in parentheses. +p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.005. 
PT licensure is 1 if PT is licensed in the current year in the state of residence, and is 0 otherwise. PT duration is the number of years since licensed if PT is licensed in the current 
year in the state of residence, and 0 otherwise.  
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Table 6  Effects of Direct Access on Log Wage for Occupational Therapists and Physical Therapists, ACS 2000–2010 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
---------OT sample--------- -------OT: Licensure=1------- ----------PT sample--------- 
OT licensure=0 0.104  0.0879 
    
-0.0474 -0.0467 
 
(1.30)  (1.07) 
    
(-0.91) (-0.87) 




















(omitted group: OT licensure=1 & no access) 
 
   
     
 
PT limited/unlimited  -0.0537* -0.0531* 
 
-0.0568* -0.0550* 0.00394 
 
0.00465 
access  (-2.30) (-2.21) 
 
(-2.55) (-2.36) (0.25) 
 
(0.30) 
(omitted group: PT no access) 
 
   
     
 
Covariates Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
State FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
 N 9,668 9,668 9,668 8351 8265 8265 19645 19645 19645 
R-squared 0.226 0.227 0.228 0.228 0.229 0.229 0.206 0.208 0.206 




Table 7  Effects of Licensure on Labor Participation of Occupational Therapists, ACS 2000–2010 
 
 
Linear Probability Model 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
OT licensure -0.186*** -0.207*** -0.108* 
   
 
(−5.10) (−5.08) (−2.11) 
   OT duration 
   
4.64e-4 0.000142 0.0212 
    
(0.57) (0.16) (1.51) 
Covariates No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
State FE No No Yes No No Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 12,017,882 10,802,891 10,802,891 12,017,882 10,802,891 10,802,891 
R-squared 0 0.002 0.002 0 0.002 0.002 
 
Probit Model (marginal effects) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
OT licensure −0.188*** −0.0494*** −0.0265** 
   
 
(−5.73) −5.52) (−2.38) 
   OT duration 
   
4.59e-04 6.63e-05 0.00469 
    
0.57 0.31 1.67 
Covariates No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
State FE No No Yes No No Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 12,017,882 10,802,891 10,802,891 12,017,882 10,802,891 10,802,891 
R-squared 0.001 0.148 0.151 0.000 0.147 0.151 
NOTE: The coefficients are reported in units of 1/1000.The coefficient of OT licensure in model (3) is -0.108 in linear probability model, which means the probability of one OT 
in one thousand persons decreased by 10.8% by changing status to licensure for OT. 
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.005.
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Table 8  Effects of PT Licensure on Labor Participation of Physical Therapists, ACS 2000–2010 
 
 
Linear Probability Model 
  (1) (2) (3) 
PT duration 0.00536*** 0.00171+ −0.191*** 
 
(6.41) (1.84) (−6.88) 
Covariates No Yes Yes 
State FE No No Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
N 11,950,613 10,739,185 10,739,185 
R-squared 0.000 0.003 0.003 
                 
 
Probit Model (marginal effects) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
PT duration 0.00516*** 3.07e-04 −0.100*** 
 
6.62 0.89 −8.27 
Covariates No Yes Yes 
State FE No No Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
N 11,950,613 10,739,185 10,739,185 
R-squared 0.001 0.126 0.127 
NOTE: The coefficients are reported in units of 1/1000.The coefficient of OT licensure in model (3) is -0.191 in linear probability model, which means the 
probability of one OT in one thousand persons decreased by 19.1% by one year of increase in the duration of licensure for PT. 
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.005. 
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Table 9  Effects of OT Licensure on Annual Hours of Labor Supplied by Occupational Therapists and Physical Therapists 
 
Panel A: OT 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
OT licensure 40.61 −16.39 −47.07** 
   
      
 
(1.20) (−0.69) (−2.99) 
   
      
OT duration<=2 
   
−52.43 −52.61 −54.26*       
    
(−0.76) (−1.03) (−2.15)       
OT duration>2 
   
45.68 −14.31 −38.41       
    
(1.35) (−0.60) (−1.46)       
OT duration 
      
2.916** 0.878 11.05** 2.558 -2.853 3.512 
       
(3.22) (1.34) (3.08) (0.81) (−1.10) (0.77) 
OT duration sq 
      
   1.141 11.95+ 17.52* 
       
   (0.13) (1.81) (2.23) 
Covariates N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y 
State FE N N Y N N Y N N Y N N Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
R-squared 0.003 0.43 0.44 0.004 0.43 0.44 0.003 0.43 0.44 0.003 0.43 0.44 
1st stage N 9,668 9,668 9,668 9,668 9,668 9,668 9,668 9,668 9,668 9,668 9,668 9,668 
2nd stage N n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
 
Panel B: PT 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
PT licensure −90.17 −31.16 −43.20** 
   
      
 
(−0.87) (−0.37) (−3.26) 
   
      
PT duration<=2 
   
−204.5 −164.1 -164.1***       
    
(−0.91) (−0.88) (−10.35)       
PT duration>2 
   
−90.17 −31.11 −4.191       
    
(−0.87) (−0.37) (−0.29)       
PT duration 
      
−0.210 −0.316 12.82** −5.385* −2.909 7.534 
       
(−0.51) (−1.03) (3.44) (−2.16) (−1.22) (0.74) 
PT duration sq 
      
    2.201 2.256 
       
    (1.17) (0.60) 
Covariates N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y 
State FE N N Y N N Y N N Y N N Y 
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
R-squared 0.001 0.46 0.47 0.001 0.46 0.47 0.001 0.46 0.47 0.001 0.46 0.47 
1st stage N 19,737 19,737 19,737 19,737 19,737 19,737 19,737 19,737 19,737 19,737 19,737 19,737 
2nd stage N n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
NOTE: t-statistics are reported in parentheses. + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.005. 
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OT: Focuses on evaluating 
and improving people’s 
abilities; emphasis on 
individuals doing their 
daily tasks.  
Like a physical therapist, an 
occupational therapist is often 
involved in educating people on how 
to prevent and treat injuries, as well 
as educating people about the 
healing process. In turn, through 
education and training, physical 
therapists often help people improve 




PT: Focuses on 
evaluating and 
diagnosing movement 
dysfunctions as well 






Figure 2  Growth in the Licensing of Occupational and Physical Therapists 
 
 
Panel A: Occupational Therapist, 1995–2011 
 
 














































Figure 3  Estimates of Total Occupational Therapists and Physical Therapists, 2000–2010 
 
 
Panel A: Occupational Therapist 
 
NOTE: The first series is the estimates of total licensed OTs from AOTA survey of state regulatory boards and rosters of 
licensees; the second series is the calculated labor force population of OTs from American Community Survey 2000–2010; the 
third series is the estimates from Occupational Employment Statistics from Bureau of Labor Statistics, which does not include 
self-employed persons; in the fourth series, the simulated total number of OTs is calculated by author using OES total divided 
by the percentage of OT employees in ACS samples. 
 
Panel B: Physical Therapist 
 
NOTE: The first series is the calculated labor force population of PTs from American Community Survey 2000–
2010; the second series is the estimates from Occupational Employment Statistics from Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
which does not include self-employed persons; in the third series, the simulated total number of PTs is calculated 
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Figure 4  Growth in Direct Access to Therapy Services, 1995–2011 
 
 



































Figure 5  Box and Whisker Plot of the Growth of Licensing Provision for Therapist, 2000–2011 
 
 
Panel A: Occupational Therapist 
 
 
Panel B: Physical Therapist 
 
NOTE: The results presented in this figure show the growth of the mean and the variance for the regulation 
requirements index of occupational therapist and physical therapist from 2000 to 2011. The requirements index for 
each state, which measures the restriction level of regulation, is produced based on series of requirements to obtain a 
license, including age, education, and background requirements, examination requirements, cost of license 
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NOTE: The distributions are calculated using an Epanechnikov kernel from the ACS 2010 sample constructed by rules in Table 
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Figure 7  Growth of Hourly Wage for Physical Therapists in Kansas 
  
NOTE: In 2000 the hourly wage for PTs in Kansas is around 6% below the national average. This gap is enlarged to 10% by 
2004, when the hourly wage for a PT is $26.92 on average in Kansas. In 2010 the hourly wage in Kansas increases to $36.25, 
only 3% lower than the national mean in that year.  
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APPENDIX TABLES AND FIGURES  
 
Table A.1  Jurisdictions Regulating Occupational Therapists and Physical Therapists 
 
Panel A: Occupational therapist 
State Type of statute Year passed 
Alabama Licensure 1990 
Alaska Licensure 1987 
Arizona Licensure 1989 
Arkansas Licensure 1977 
California Licensure 2000 
Colorado Registration 2008 
Connecticut Licensure 1978 
Delaware Licensure 1985 
District of Columbia Licensure 1978 
Florida Licensure 1975 
Georgia Licensure 1976 
Hawaii Registration 1998 
Idaho Licensure 1982 
Illinois Licensure 1983 
Indiana Licensure 2007 
Iowa Licensure 1980 
Kansas Licensure 2002 
Kentucky Licensure 1986 
Louisiana Licensure 1979 
Maine Licensure 1984 
Maryland Licensure 1977 
Massachusetts Licensure 1983 
Michigan Licensure 2009 
Minnesota Licensure 2000 
Mississippi Licensure 1988 
Missouri Licensure 1997 
Montana Licensure 1985 
Nebraska Licensure 1984 
Nevada Licensure 1991 
New Hampshire Licensure 1977 
New Jersey Licensure 1993 
New Mexico Licensure 1983 
New York Licensure 1975 
North Carolina Licensure 1984 
North Dakota Licensure 1983 
Ohio Licensure 1976 
Oklahoma Licensure 1984 
Oregon Licensure 1977 
Pennsylvania Licensure 1982 
Rhode Island Licensure 1984 
South Carolina Licensure 1977 
South Dakota Licensure 1986 
Tennessee Licensure 1983 
Texas Licensure 1983 
Utah Licensure 1977 
Vermont Licensure 2002 
Virginia Licensure 1998 
Washington Licensure 1984 
West Virginia Licensure 1978 
Wisconsin Licensure 2000 
Wyoming Licensure 1991 
 
 
Panel B: Physical therapist 
State Type of statute Year passed 
Alabama Licensure 1965 
Alaska Licensure 1957 
Arizona Licensure 1952 
Arkansas Licensure 1959 
California Licensure 1953 
Colorado Licensure 1959 
Connecticut Licensure 1942 
Delaware Licensure 1953 
District of Columbia Licensure 
 Florida Licensure 1957 
Georgia Licensure 1951 
Hawaii Licensure 1957 
Idaho Licensure 1963 
Illinois Licensure 1965 
Indiana Licensure 1957 
Iowa Licensure 1965 
Kansas Licensure 2003 
Kentucky Licensure 1958 
Louisiana Licensure 1966 
Maine Licensure 1955 
Maryland Licensure 1957 
Massachusetts Licensure 1951 
Michigan Licensure 1965 
Minnesota Licensure 1951 
Mississippi Licensure 1966 
Missouri Licensure 1969 
Montana Licensure 1961 
Nebraska Licensure 1957 
Nevada Licensure 1955 
New Hampshire Licensure 1974 
New Jersey Licensure 1963 
New Mexico Licensure 1953 
New York Licensure 1926 
North Carolina Licensure 1959 
North Dakota Licensure 1959 
Ohio Licensure 1959 
Oklahoma Licensure 1965 
Oregon Licensure 1959 
Pennsylvania Licensure 1913 
Rhode Island Licensure 1962 
South Carolina Licensure 1952 
South Dakota Licensure 1955 
Tennessee Licensure 1955 
Texas Licensure 1971 
Utah Licensure 1953 
Vermont Licensure 1957 
Virginia Licensure 1958 
Washington Licensure 1949 
West Virginia Licensure 1963 
Wisconsin Licensure 1975 
Wyoming Licensure 1962 
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Initial observations 10,134 21,394 
1. Unpaid family worker  –6 –12 
2. Educational attainment (some college for OT and PT) –94 –528 
3. Age over 65 –85 –242 
4. Experience(=Age-Years of schooling-6) less than 0 –18 –127 
5. Work more than 60 hours weekly –66 –264 
6. Hourly wage less than the federal minimum during 2000–2010 –98 –242 
7. Trim down the top 1% of the sample by wage –99 –191 




Table A.3  CPS Estimates of the Effects of Regulations on Log Wage for Occupational Therapist, 1995–2011 
 
Panel A: Licensure and duration 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
licensure 0.0354 0.0358 0.0282 
   
 
0.0457 0.0440 0.0816 
   otduration 
   
-0.000410 0.000239 -0.00983 
    






















































































































State FE No No Yes No No Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 886 886 886 886 886 886 





Table A.3  (Continued) 
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Panel B: Direct access to occupational and physical therapy services 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
ot_access −0.00393 −0.0174 −0.0180 
   
−0.0135 −0.0271 
 
0.0199 0.0191 0.0727 
   
0.0193 0.0733 
pt_access 
   
−0.0348* −0.0304 −0.0511 −0.0286 −0.0541 
    





















































































































0.0323 0.0336 0.0323 0.0337 
State FE No No Yes No No Yes No Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 886 886 886 886 886 886 886 886 











Table A.4  Effects of Licensure on Log Wage of Occupational Therapists using the OES, 2000–2010 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
licensure 0.0217*** 0.0277*** −0.00565 
   
  
 
(2.71) (3.23) (−0.59) 
   
  
otduration 
   
0.000728* 0.000880* 0.00119 0.00384*** 0.0252+ 
    


















0.00433 0.00357   
State FE No No Yes No No Yes No Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 557 557 557 557 557 557 0.88 0.88 







Table A.5  Effects of Licensure on Total Employment of Occupational Therapists using the OES and the 
AOTA survey data 
 
OES, 2000–2010 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
licensure −0.114 −0.0291 0.00330 
   
 
0.170 0.168 0.0417 
   otduration 
   
−0.0009 0.00133 0.00609 
    



















State FE no no yes no no yes 
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes 
N 558 558 558 558 558 558 
R-squared 0.008 0.058 0.981 0.007 0.058 0.981 
 
 
AOTA survey of state regulatory boards and licensee rosters, 2001–2010 
  (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
              
licensure −0.0885 −0.00403 
−0.0747**
* 
   
 
0.167 0.162 0.0226 
   otduration 
   
0.000960 0.00341 0.00577 
    



















State FE no no yes no no yes 
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes 
N 497 497 497 497 497 497 







Table A.6  Key Variable in the Development of the Licensing Index for OTs and PTs 
Major components Definition 
Examination requirement 
1 if jurisprudence exam required in addition to the standard professional 
examination; otherwise 0 
Age requirement 
2 if minimum age above 21 is required; 1 if an age requirement clarified but under 
21; 0 if no requirement 
Continuing education 
requirement 
1 for each ten hours of continuing education annually;  
0 if no continuing education required 
Background check 
1 if a criminal background checked is required for application or renewal;  
otherwise 0 
Cost of license 1 for each one hundred dollars of average cost for license annually 
Additional documents 
1 if at least two additional documents required for supporting education 
achievement, reputation or moral character; 0.5 if one additional document 







Table A.7  Differences between Occupational Therapists and Physical Therapists, Wage and Annual Hours of 
Labor Supply  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Wage Wage Wage Hours Hours Hours 
       OT dummy −0.047*** −0.019* −0.019+ −126.4*** −52.88*** −53.32*** 






















































































































State FE No No Yes No No Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 29,456 29,456 29,456 29,456 29,456 29,456 












  (1) (2) 
otduration 0.0059*** 0.0792* 
 
(2.60) (2.16) 
Covariates Yes Yes 
State FE No Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.18 0.21 
1st stage N 9,602 9,602 
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